Their paper, titled Cutting Through Narratives on Chinese Arctic Investments<\/em>, was published in June. It was written by Arctic researchers Anders Christoffer Edstr\u00f8m from Norway, Gu\u00f0bj\u00f6rg R\u00edkey Th. Hauksd\u00f3ttir from Iceland, and Whitney Lackenbauer of Trent University in Peterborough, Ont.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For years, China\u2019s Arctic ambitions have faced international scrutiny.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In 2013, China was granted observer status at the Arctic Council, an intergovernmental organization of all eight Arctic nations: Canada, the United States, Russia, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Sweden.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A few years later, in 2018, Beijing announced<\/a> its Polar Silk Road strategy. It envisioned China\u2019s deeper involvement in Arctic governance along with mineral and scientific exploration of the region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Since then, China has proclaimed itself a \u201cnear-Arctic state\u201d \u2014 despite not having any territory in the polar areas \u2014 and the country\u2019s ambassador to Canada, Wang Di, told<\/a> Nunatsiaq News last year that Arctic affairs should be a concern of a \u201cglobal village.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Since 2003, China is estimated to have invested more than $90 billion above the Arctic Circle, largely in energy and mineral sectors, according to the U.S. House of Representatives committee on foreign affairs estimates in 2022.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, the Harvard researchers say that figure is \u201cinflated\u201d with unsuccessful investments and projects proposed but not implemented.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cOur research finds that these numbers are highly exaggerated and often mobilized to support a narrative in which China is successfully \u2018buying up\u2019 the Arctic region,\u201d the paper said.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Of 57 Chinese investment projects that researchers list, 18 are active and only one is located in Canada. A majority of the projects have been either cancelled or are in question.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Of the eight Nordic member nations, only Russia has allowed a significant Chinese presence in its Arctic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In 2022, the two countries signed a joint statement proclaiming a relationship with \u201cno limits\u201d including joint oversight of traffic along the Northern Sea Route, 5,600-kilometre shipping passage along Russia\u2019s Arctic coast line.<\/p>\n\n\n\n As well, the countries agreed on joint naval and coast guard exercises in the Bering Sea, and joint air patrols near the coast of Alaska.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But when it comes to Canada and the other six \u201clike-minded\u201d Arctic states, nearly all Chinese investment in the region has failed or stalled.<\/p>\n\n\n\n China\u2019s footprint in Canada\u2019s North only includes a Nunavik nickel mine owned by Jien Canada Mining Ltd. and two mineral development projects in the Yukon and the N.W.T. that have been \u201cin stasis for many years.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cChina\u2019s investment record in the Canadian North is not strong, and Chinese companies have also seen significant failures,\u201d the researchers said.<\/p>\n\n\n\n One of those failures was in 2020, when Chinese state-owned Shandong Gold Mining Co. wanted to buy<\/a> the Hope Bay gold mine complex, 150 kilometres southwest of Cambridge Bay, for $207.4 million.<\/p>\n\n\n\n![\"Out](\"https:\/\/arcticwatch.info\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/Screenshot-2025-07-09-at-1.28.12-PM-1024x793.png\")