{"id":3157,"date":"2025-06-20T00:40:00","date_gmt":"2025-06-19T22:40:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/arcticwatch.info\/?p=3157"},"modified":"2025-06-16T22:49:09","modified_gmt":"2025-06-16T20:49:09","slug":"india-in-the-arctic-advancing-a-new-path-for-strategic-autonomy-beyond-russia","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/arcticwatch.info\/index.php\/2025\/06\/20\/india-in-the-arctic-advancing-a-new-path-for-strategic-autonomy-beyond-russia\/","title":{"rendered":"India in the Arctic: Advancing a New Path for Strategic Autonomy Beyond Russia"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

At the 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi committed to \u201cpromote a democratic and rules-based international order in which all nations, small and large, thrive as equal and sovereign\u201d.1)<\/sup><\/a><\/a> Today, such a \u201crules-based international order\u201d is challenged by the actions of Russia under President Vladimir Putin, primarily the war in Ukraine, which contradicts the principles of equality and sovereignty, and subsequent efforts by that country to garner the support of other non-Western states. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Meanwhile, Modi\u2019s 2018 statement seems to lack substantive policy backing due to India\u2019s close ties with Russia; India is Russia\u2019s second-largest supplier of restricted technologies2)<\/sup><\/a><\/a> and has pledged to boost its bilateral trade with the Russian Federation to US$100 billion by 2030.3)<\/sup><\/a><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

One arena where the India-Russia relationship is becoming troubling for India\u2019s European, and more specifically Nordic, counterparts is in the Arctic, where Russia has actively courted India as a new partner, as evident from its choice of India over China to construct its new class of non-nuclear icebreaker last October.4)<\/sup><\/a><\/a> Russia has also formulated expansive plans for the BRICS grouping in the Arctic, directly challenging the interests of the remaining Arctic states or the so-called Arctic 7 (A7).5)<\/sup><\/a> The Russia-India collaboration reflects Russia\u2019s strategic determination in developing its Northern Sea Route (NSR) despite Western sanctions6)<\/sup><\/a><\/a>while also highlighting India\u2019s growing aspirations in the Arctic. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The two countries are also considering agreements on vessel repair at Indian shipyards and polar training for Indian seafarers, as discussed in the first Joint Working Group on Cooperation in the NSR meeting between Russia and India on 11 October last year.7)<\/sup><\/a><\/a> Additionally, in July 2024, Russia\u2019s Far East and Arctic Development Corporation signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Indian Chamber of International Business in Vladivostok to foster joint investment projects and facilitate business exchange.8)<\/sup><\/a><\/a><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Scholars and strategists9)<\/sup><\/a><\/a> across India as well as in the West10)<\/sup><\/a><\/a><\/a><\/a> tend to focus on Russia-India relations through the lens of foreign policy decision-making in India that aims to attain strategic autonomy by pursuing a \u2018Bharat First\u2019 (India First) policy. This approach emphasises self-sufficiency, seeks to insulate Indian decision-making from external pressures, and allows for greater flexibility in foreign partnerships.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

India\u2019s pivot towards economic liberalisation after the Cold War marked a quiet alignment with the United States (US)-led order.11)<\/sup><\/a><\/a> India\u2019s commitment to the liberal economic and strategic framework has been reinforced by economic growth, especially as Chinese revisionism threatens this order. Consequently, India\u2019s perception of collective security has also evolved.12)<\/sup><\/a><\/a> While entering a formal defence arrangement with another country appears to be unlikely, India has shown a greater willingness to enter and contribute to collective deterrence frameworks in recent years as evident in its participation in groupings such as the Quad, which involves the US, Japan, Australia, and India.13)<\/sup><\/a><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

This raises the question of why India has not sought to work with likeminded democracies in the Arctic, instead opting for closer cooperation with an authoritarian regime with which the other seven Arctic states have largely severed ties.14)<\/sup><\/a> There are multiple factors at play, but part of the answer lies in the economic opportunism of purchasing Russian oil at a discounted rate.15)<\/sup><\/a><\/a> The long-lasting defence ties between Russia and India will also continue to play a critical role in shaping India\u2019s Russia strategy even if the Indian government downgrades its relations with the Putin regime.16)<\/sup><\/a><\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

India\u2019s Arctic collaboration with Russia is also closely tied to the two countries\u2019 ongoing space cooperation, which has a long history dating to 1962, when the Soviet Union (USSR) and India signed their first space cooperation agreement.17)<\/sup><\/a><\/a><\/a><\/a> Space capabilities could unlock the Arctic\u2019s potential as a global hub for energy, resources, and shipping and provide critical tools to secure and manage commercial, civil, and military operations.18)<\/sup><\/a> Although there are no ongoing collaborations between the two countries in the Arctic, with joint work appearing to have slowed since Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine,19)<\/sup><\/a><\/a> the two countries could deepen their space partnership in the future and apply their joint capabilities to the Arctic maritime and energy domains.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Last but not least, New Delhi\u2019s approach towards Russia in the Arctic, and beyond, appears to be at least partly influenced by concerns over China\u2019s growing influence in general and over Russia in particular as the latter becomes more isolated.20)<\/sup><\/a><\/a> India is still wary that an increasingly China-aligned Russia could abandon its historically neutral stance in any future China-India conflict and is concerned about a potential Russia-China-Pakistan alignment.21)<\/sup><\/a><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Above all, however, this paper argues that this divergence in India\u2019s approach in the Arctic is due to its geographical proximity to China in the Indo-Pacific theatre22)<\/sup><\/a><\/a> and structural differences between the Indo-Pacific and the Arctic.<\/p>\n\n\n

\n
\"Indian
Indian Prime Minster attending the Second India Nordic Summit alongside his Nordic Counterparts in Copenhagen in 2022. Photo: Indian Ministry of External Affairs<\/figcaption><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n

India\u2019s Interest in the Arctic<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Since the early 2020s, India\u2019s Arctic strategy has evolved from being primarily scientific to being informed by broader geopolitics. India has maintained a presence in the region since 2008, when it set up the Himadri research station in Svalbard; in 2022, it formalised its ambitions by releasing an Arctic Policy.23)<\/sup><\/a><\/a> Recent shifts in the global security landscape, marked by deteriorating relations between Russia and the West and China\u2019s expanding Arctic cooperation with Russia, have prompted India to pay closer attention to security and strategic dynamics in the region.24)<\/sup><\/a><\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, as an emerging Arctic actor, India faces multiple uncertainties in navigating the region\u2019s complex security and geopolitical challenges, requiring policymakers in New Delhi to develop a multifaceted strategy that addresses diverse issues, political dynamics, and geographic considerations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Since 2021, India has been supporting infrastructural development along the NSR25)<\/sup><\/a><\/a> to capitalise on the commercial benefits of the route and diversify its supply routes with Arctic resources, including gas and critical minerals, to fuel its rapidly growing economy.26)<\/sup><\/a><\/a> India\u2019s engagement in the Arctic is also driven by its strategic goal of securing Russia\u2019s commitment to an expanded International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which could deliver Arctic resources to India once\/if it is operationalised.27)<\/sup><\/a><\/a> By connecting India to both Russia and the Nordic-Baltic region, INSTC could accelerate trade ties between these regions and India by. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Amongst other things, connecting New Delhi with the iron ore line between Lule\u00e5, Kiruna, and Narvik as well as the European Union (EU)-funded Bothnian Corridor.28)<\/sup><\/a><\/a> From a strategic vantage point, more importantly, the INSTC presents an alternative to China\u2019s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and hence its operationalisation could enable India to better challenge China\u2019s growing strategic influence.29)<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

India\u2019s Arctic ambitions are also influenced by concerns over China\u2019s growing presence in the region; the government in New Delhi is apprehensive that China\u2019s growing presence could divert the US\u2019s focus away from the Indo-Pacific.30)<\/sup><\/a><\/a> New Arctic sea routes could also provide Beijing with an alternative to the Malacca Strait, easing what is commonly known as the \u201cMalacca dilemma\u201d.31)<\/sup><\/a><\/a> This could create a strategic challenge for India given that its primary strategy in a potential conflict with China hinges on disrupting Chinese shipping in the Indian Ocean, and an alternative route for China would paralyse this strategy.32)<\/sup><\/a><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Russia\u2019s Strategic Interests for Partnering with India in the Arctic<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 marked a crisis in relations between Russia and the West, including the Arctic, with cooperation halted and further sanctions imposed on Russia. The ideas around Arctic exceptionalism and a shared community with Russia were disbanded.33)<\/sup><\/a><\/a> Nevertheless, the Arctic Council continued to function with Russian participation, albeit at a low level. Following the remaining seven Arctic states becoming North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) members after Finland\u2019s and Sweden\u2019s accession in 2023 and 2024, respectively, Russia has been proactively seeking partnerships with non-Arctic actors, especially China.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Russia\u2019s Arctic ambitions centre around three main objectives.34)<\/sup><\/a><\/a> First, Russia intends to tap into the region\u2019s vast natural resources and accelerate their integration into global energy markets. Second, Russia aims to advance the regulatory framework and infrastructure of the NSR, enabling it to capture the commercial gains from an accessible Arctic and shape the regulatory landscape. Third, Russia seeks to attract investment to expedite the socioeconomic development of its Arctic territories, which it views as essential for its \u201cmilitary posture and operations in both war and peace\u201d.35)<\/sup><\/a><\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The underdevelopment of this region is seen as a vulnerability that foreign powers could exploit to foster instability, and insufficient local population growth could hamper Russia\u2019s plans to increase its military presence in the area.36)<\/sup><\/a><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Within this context, the authorities in Moscow see potential benefits in India\u2019s increased Arctic engagement.37)<\/sup><\/a><\/a> India\u2019s presence could allow Russia to diversify its pool of investors and reduce its reliance on China under the pretext of Arctic cooperation towards deepening strategic and defence ties with New Delhi.38)<\/sup><\/a><\/a> Unlike China, it is reasonable to suggest that India is likely perceived as a partner with fewer regional ambitions and hence less capable of, and indeed willing to, challenge the Arctic\u2019s geopolitical balance, at least in the medium term. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

So, while India is not capable of matching China\u2019s financial contributions, its comparatively limited resources make it less likely to contest Russia\u2019s dominance in the Arctic. India\u2019s more favourable global image also makes it a less contentious partner than China, thereby attracting less international scrutiny. Additionally, India-Russia bilateral relations have been long-standing, and both countries have similar perspectives on state sovereignty and perceive Western adherence to international law to be inconsistent.39)<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

India\u2019s increasing role in the Arctic helps Russia not only counterbalance China\u2019s influence but also mediate improving ties between the governments in New Delhi and Washington, D.C., potentially even allowing it to establish itself as an intermediary between China and India in the long term.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Security Dynamics in the Arctic<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The Arctic region spans 24 time zones, eight countries, and three continents. Its territory is six times that of the EU 27. Climatic conditions across the region also vary; the Gulf Stream keeps the Norwegian Arctic coast and the waters of Northwest Russia ice free even during the coldest months of the year as opposed to the ice-covered waters of North Alaska and Canada. The level of development, culture, infrastructure, and resources also vary across the region. Accounting for the differences between the local Inuit communities in Northwest Greenland and the oil-producing towns on the North Slope in Alaska, it is apparent that the Arctic is by no means one coherent region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Arctic security issues and dynamics also vary by state and level and requires an analysis of international competition (such as addressing why the US is increasingly focusing on China in an Arctic context and why China appears eager to engage in signaling off Alaska\u2019s coast), regional interaction (such as why Arctic states continued to sign agreements promoting Northern cooperation until 2022 and why the Arctic Council has persisted), and national defence (such as why some Arctic states, but not others, invest heavily in their Northern defence posture).40)<\/sup><\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

While the other seven Arctic states have recognised China\u2019s growing Arctic presence as a strategic development that needs to be checked, they do not perceive it as an immediate regional threat. Instead, it is Russia that is viewed as posing a greater immediate challenge to regional stability.41)<\/sup><\/a><\/a><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Russia views the Arctic coastline as segmented into different theatres of operation, the most prominent ones being the Barents\/North Atlantic and the Bering\/North Pacific.42)<\/sup><\/a> This segmentation also aligns with how security concerns in the Arctic region are structured, forming two sub-regions: Russia-Nordics (focused on Fennoscandia), which involves interactions between Russia and the seven other Arctic countries, and Russia-US (with some Canadian involvement).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Arctic has emerged as an arena for contestation and cooperation since 2018. Security in the North Atlantic is determined by the presence and activities of Russian strategic forces on the Kola Peninsula and Russia\u2019s emphasis on protecting and showcasing its nuclear deterrence and second-strike capabilities. Meanwhile, in the North Pacific, the increasing bilateral relations between China and Russia are becoming apparent in the military and security domain, which has resulted in increased US engagement in Alaska\u2019s strategic position in countering the Sino-Russian alliance-of-convenience.43)<\/sup><\/a><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

India\u2019s Role in the Arctic<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

There is a need for India to determine its geopolitical role in the Arctic across different issues, political dynamics, and Arctic geographies. It would be challenging for India to mount a military or security presence in different parts of the Arctic. India is not part of the NATO alliance or a security or defence alliance with Russia and has not participated in military exercises above the Arctic Circle. However, states such as India, which are located closer to the equator than the Arctic Circle, might want to engage in military exercises or operations led by an Arctic state to train in an extreme environment and to build diplomatic and military relations.44)<\/sup><\/a><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Non-Arctic states such Italy, France, and China have already showcased their capacity, capability, and to some extent, symbolic interest by sending a state vessel into Arctic waters. China\u2019s acquisition of polar icebreakers primarily designed for research purposes arguably fulfil several goals, performing research, enabling Chinese learning and capacity building for operating in polar environments, and highlighting Chinese global reach and interests. An Indian polar class research vessel is also increasingly likely as India\u2019s global as well as Arctic and Antarctic45)<\/sup><\/a> interests grow;46)<\/sup><\/a><\/a> experts have stated that \u201cicebreaking capabilities will be an important requirement for India not only in terms of scientific research but equally for economic and strategic interests in the Arctic\u201d.47)<\/sup><\/a><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

For India, the North Pacific Arctic or sub-Arctic domain might be the most proximal. However, the North Atlantic is the easiest to access due to its milder temperatures and limited sea ice as well as developed infrastructure. India\u2019s strong Arctic focus is highlighted by the strengthening India-Norway relations in recent years and India\u2019s foothold in the Norwegian Arctic archipelago of Svalbard, reflecting India\u2019s aspirations in the maritime sector.48)<\/sup><\/a><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

India\u2019s Arctic presence can serve both domestic and international objectives through research, economic activity, and governance. Besides the benefits of scientific data and research, India\u2019s presence in Svalbard, with a focus on its first year-round presence at Himadri,49)<\/sup><\/a><\/a> and its status as an original signatory to the Svalbard Treaty in 192050)<\/sup><\/a><\/a> can communicate India\u2019s competence and global aspirations to a domestic audience. Accordingly, it is likely that Indian companies and government entities may also begin operating in the Arctic in the near future.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As in the case of China, India\u2019s increasing influence in global politics is likely to result in its global engagements and interests reflecting an Arctic component. However, how it directs these interests and the issues that it decides to address (and with what tools) remains to be seen. Generally, non-Arctic states have been wary of highlighting a strong divergence from the interests of Arctic states.51)<\/sup><\/a> The most apparent example of outside interests challenging existing governance mechanisms and\/or ongoing activity in the Arctic has been the EU\u2019s environmental, economic, and governance statements that were released at the beginning of its Arctic endeavour from around 2008.52)<\/sup><\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Fears about China\u2019s interests and role in Arctic governance also persist, although China seems to have taken a relatively muted approach to sensitive issues such as resource management or new governance mechanisms that might irk Arctic states.53)<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

India\u2019s ambitions of becoming a global power broker\u2014reinforced by its position between the US, Europe, and Russia and its ambivalent relationship with China\u2014factors in to its Arctic presence. With the Modi government seemingly aiming to prevent Russia from becoming overly dependent on China, the Arctic is emerging as a key arena to counteract China\u2019s expanding influence by offering Russia a valuable alternative partner.54)<\/sup><\/a><\/a><\/a> This is one reason why India supports Russia\u2019s calls for BRICS+ involvement in Arctic governance; such involved would allow New Delhi to be better positioned to influence decision making in Russia and limit the scope of joint Russian-Chinese initiatives.55)<\/sup><\/a><\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

India\u2019s position as being \u201cnon-West but not anti-West\u201d56)<\/sup><\/a><\/a> will allow it a central role in the BRICS grouping and any of its Arctic endeavours.57)<\/sup><\/a><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

For the remaining seven Arctic states, who prefer to keep Arctic governance exclusive to states with Arctic territory, India\u2019s stance is likely to be unfavourable. The Nordic states are observing how India\u2019s geopolitical ambitions unfold in the Arctic. Given the growing friendship of convenience between Russia and China in the context of the Arctic and the North Pacific, there are hopes are that India can play a balancing role vis-\u00e0-vis China\u2014and possibly Russia, should the latter collapse due to external and internal pressures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For India, this is an opportunity to strengthen its global positioning and improve relations with the Nordic countries\u2014and perhaps also Canada, with whom it shares a different and more challenging relationship at the moment. However, in order to seize this opportunity, India must recognise that as long as Russia continues its war efforts in Europe\u2014some even originating from its Arctic bases58)<\/sup><\/a><\/a>\u2014it cannot maintain conflicting strategic positions. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Policy Recommendations<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Develop an Arctic Strategy Aligned with India\u2019s Indo-Pacific Vision<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

India\u2019s Indo-Pacific strategy, built on collaboration with democratic allies to uphold a free and open region, offers a proven model that can be adapted for the Arctic. In the Indo-Pacific, India has actively engaged with countries like the US, Japan, and Australia, emphasising shared values such as freedom of navigation and rule of law59)<\/sup><\/a><\/a> This model not only reflects India\u2019s own values but also reinforces its role as a stabilising force in a region marked by rising Chinese influence. Replicating this approach in the Arctic could allow India to promote a similar vision of openness and cooperation, thereby countering Russia\u2019s disruption in the region without directly challenging its own Russia policies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Aligning India\u2019s Arctic strategy with its Indo-Pacific vision would also help solidify its role as a global balancing power\u2014one that is committed to a rules-based international order. Unlike the Indo-Pacific, where India\u2019s partnership with the US and other allies has actively contributed to regional stability, in the Arctic, India\u2019s current approach lacks a similar multilateral dimension. Focusing on partnerships with Arctic states that share India\u2019s commitment to transparency and stability would signal India\u2019s seriousness as a global partner in these regions. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

A commitment to a cooperative Arctic strategy would also more fully resonate with India\u2019s Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam<\/em> philosophy (the world is one family),60)<\/sup><\/a><\/a> projecting India\u2019s vision of global unity and peace while reinforcing its image as a responsible, stabilising actor on the international stage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Prioritise Economic and Security Partnerships with Europe<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

With the EU and NATO designating China as a \u201csystemic rival\u201d,61)<\/sup><\/a><\/a> Europe\u2019s security priorities are increasingly aligned with India\u2019s own strategic concerns. The shift from Europe\u2019s historical caution about confronting China directly has allowed for stronger, more candid engagement with India on mutual security concerns, particularly regarding Chinese expansionism.62)<\/sup><\/a><\/a> However, India\u2019s close partnership with Russia could jeopardise these evolving relationships as most European states remain wary of Russian aggression and see the Putin regime as a destabilising force.63)<\/sup><\/a><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

This concern is especially pronounced in the Nordic context, where Russia\u2019s revisionist actions are viewed as a direct national security threat not just in Finland, Norway, and Sweden but across the Nordic and Baltic region.64)<\/sup><\/a><\/a> With their geographic proximity to Russia, these countries are acutely aware of the security implications of Russia\u2019s military posturing, cyber operations, and political interference in the region.65)<\/sup><\/a><\/a> To the Nordics, Putin\u2019s Russia represents the same unpredictability and expansionism that China poses for India, making containment not merely a strategic preference but also an essential policy objective. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The urgency around containing Russian influence is deeply rooted in the historical memory of the Soviet threat in the same way that India\u2019s threat perception of China has its root in the historical context of its bilateral relationship with Beijing. For the north, addressing the Russian threat is a prerequisite for upholding sovereignty.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If India\u2019s Arctic strategy continues to lean on Russia, it could strain India\u2019s relations with Europe, and indeed with the US, which sanctioned 19 Indian firms due to their links with Russia in November 2024.66)<\/sup><\/a><\/a> Unlike China, which uses its dominance in critical minerals and electric vehicles electric vehicles (EV) battery supply chains67)<\/sup><\/a><\/a> to respond to Western sanctions, India does not have such options,68)<\/sup><\/a><\/a> and Western sanctions could be far more consequential for India and its economic growth outlook.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To mitigate this risk, India could consider actively pursuing stronger partnerships with European countries, particularly the Nordic states, which have high stakes in Arctic affairs. Joint initiatives in areas such as critical infrastructure, digitalisation, and environmental protection would enable India to contribute to European security priorities while building its Arctic credentials. Engaging with Europe in this way would not only enhance India\u2019s strategic autonomy but also strengthen its diplomatic ties with European states and bolster its position on the global stage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Advance Strategic Autonomy by Reducing Russian Defence Dependencies<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

India\u2019s reliance on Russia for defence equipment has historical roots and is likely to remain in place for the foreseeable future. However, New Delhi has begun to diversify its defence supply chain in recent years, especially through the \u2018Make in India\u2019 initiative and partnerships with Western nations.69)<\/sup><\/a><\/a> The ongoing war in Ukraine has exacerbated delays in Russian defence deliveries,70)<\/sup><\/a><\/a> which could erode confidence in Russia\u2019s reliability as a defence partner.71)<\/sup><\/a><\/a> It is plausible that continued reliance on Russia for defence supplies may ultimately restrict India\u2019s push for greater strategic autonomy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Western Arctic countries need to seize on this opportunity and attempt to proactively engage with India by accelerating their defence and security ties with New Delhi, such as through the Nordic-India Summit which have been taking place since 2018. The Arctic states also need to reconsider their stance on exclusivity in the Arctic and instead be willing to invite India into various Arctic processes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

India, on the other hand, needs to diversify its partnerships with countries that share its security outlook, including the US, France, and other Western allies. This would reduce the risks associated with Russian dependencies and align India more closely with the defence frameworks of its Arctic partners. Additionally, by reducing its dependence on Russian arms, India could avoid undermining its image as a neutral, responsible actor on the global stage. Such a shift would enable India to better integrate into coalitions in regions where Russian influence is viewed with suspicion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ultimately, an Arctic strategy that strikes a balance between India\u2019s relations with Russia and the Western Arctic states is more likely to reinforce India\u2019s strategic autonomy by enabling it to maintain a balanced position in its relationships with other major powers, thereby enhancing its role as a credible security partner on the world stage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This article was first published by ORF on 23 April 2025 and is available from https:\/\/www.orfonline.org\/research\/india-in-the-arctic-a-potential-pathway-to-strategic-autonomy-beyond-russia<\/a><\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nima Khorrami<\/a> is a Research Associate at The Arctic Institute. Andreas \u00d8sthagen<\/a> is a Senior Fellow at The Arctic Institute.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u219111,<\/a> \u219112,<\/a> \u219122<\/a><\/th>Gopal, P (2024) India and Collective Defence in the Indo-Pacific: Possibilities, Prospects and Challenges. Available from https:\/\/www.ussc.edu.au\/india-and-collective-defence-in-the-indo-pacific-possibilities-prospects-and-challenges<\/a>. Accessed on 29 August 2024<\/td><\/tr>
\u219113,<\/a> \u219159<\/a><\/th>Malhotra, A (2023) Engagement, Not Entanglement: India\u2019s Relationship with the Quad. Available from https:\/\/gjia.georgetown.edu\/2023\/05\/01\/engagement-not-entanglement-indias-relationship-with-the-quad\/<\/a>. Accessed on 29 August 2024<\/td><\/tr>
\u219114<\/a><\/th>Following Russia\u2019s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Western Arctic states suspended Arctic cooperation as part of broader efforts to sever ties with Moscow. These restrictions remain in place, with interactions limited to politically non-sensitive scientific work within Arctic Council working groups.<\/td><\/tr>
\u219115,<\/a> \u219116,<\/a> \u219120,<\/a> \u219121<\/a><\/th>Bajpaee, C and Toremark, L (2024) India-Russia Relations. Available from https:\/\/www.chathamhouse.org\/2024\/10\/india-russia-relations<\/a>. Accessed on 3 November 2024<\/td><\/tr>
\u219117<\/a><\/th>Dutta, T (2021) Putin Visits India amid New Delhi\u2019s Growing Friendship with Washington. Available from https:\/\/www.thenationalnews.com\/world\/2021\/12\/05\/putin-visits-india-amid-new-delhis-growing-friendship-with-washington\/<\/a>. Accessed on 3 November 2024; Dhawan, S (1981) Cooperation in Space between the USSR and India. Available from https:\/\/india.mid.ru\/en\/history\/articles_and_documents\/cooperation_in_space\/<\/a>. Accessed on 3 November 2024; Pareek, A and Gubin, A (2021) India-Russia Space Cooperation: A Way Forward. Available from https:\/\/static1.squarespace.com\/static\/618a55c4cb03246776b68559\/t\/622866005041cb42e02390f5\/1646814722652\/India-Russia-Space-Cooperation-A-Way-Forward.pdf<\/a>. Accessed on 3 November 2024<\/td><\/tr>
\u219118<\/a><\/th>Bjorkum, K (2021) Arctic Space Strategy: The US and Norwegian Common Interest and Strategic Effort. Strategic Studies Quarterly<\/em> 15, no. 3: 88\u2013112<\/td><\/tr>
\u219119<\/a><\/th>Bhandari, K (2022) The War in Ukraine and Its Implications on India\u2019s Space Program. Available from https:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/research\/2022\/03\/the-war-in-ukraine-and-its-implications-on-indias-space-program?lang=en<\/a>. Accessed on 1 November 2024<\/td><\/tr>
\u219123<\/a><\/th>Government of India (2022) India\u2019s Arctic Policy: Building a Partnership for Sustainable Development. Available from https:\/\/www.moes.gov.in\/sites\/default\/files\/2022-03\/compressed-SINGLE-PAGE-ENGLISH.pdf<\/a>. Accessed on 3 November 2025<\/td><\/tr>
\u219124<\/a><\/th>Sharma, J (2024) India in The Big Picture of Arctic Geopolitics: An Actor-Oriented Analysis, ed. Winther, I, N and \u00d8sthagen, A (2024) Lysaker: Fridtjof Nansen Institute. Available from https:\/\/www.fni.no\/getfile.php\/1318301-1706208108\/Filer\/Publikasjoner\/FNI Report 1 2024.pdf<\/a>. Accessed on 10 December 2024<\/td><\/tr>
\u219125<\/a><\/th>Danilov, P, B (2021) India Has Entered the High North to Ascertain Global Reach, Says Expert on Polar Geopolitics. Available from https:\/\/www.highnorthnews.com\/en\/india-has-entered-high-north-ascertain-global-reach-says-expert-polar-geopolitics<\/a>. Accessed on 29 August 2024<\/td><\/tr>
\u219126<\/a><\/th>Bisen, A (2024) Arctic Geopolitics and Governance: An Indian Perspective. Available from https:\/\/www.eastwestcenter.org\/publications\/arctic-geopolitics-and-governance-indian-perspective<\/a>. Accessed on 2 November, 2024<\/td><\/tr>
\u219127,<\/a> \u219128<\/a><\/th>Sarma, H, C and Menezes, D, R (2018) The International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC): India\u2019s Grand Plan for Northern Connectivity. Available from https:\/\/polarconnection.org\/india-instc-nordic-arctic\/<\/a>. Accessed on 2 November 2024<\/td><\/tr>
\u219129<\/a><\/th>Chan, L, H (2020) Can China Remake Regional Order? Contestation with India over the Belt and Road Initiative, Global Change, Peace and Security<\/em> 32, no. 2: 199\u2013217<\/td><\/tr>
\u219130,<\/a> \u219132<\/a><\/th>Suhag, V (2022) India\u2019s Arctic Security Dimension: \u2018Thought through\u2019 or \u2018a Remedial Process to Address an Insecurity\u2019. Available from https:\/\/www.thearcticinstitute.org\/india-arctic-security-dimension-thought-through-remedial-process-address-insecurity\/<\/a>. Accessed on 4 November 2024<\/td><\/tr>
\u219131<\/a><\/th>Suhag, V (2022) India\u2019s Arctic Security Dimension: \u2018Thought through\u2019 or \u2018a Remedial Process to Address an Insecurity\u2019. Available from https:\/\/www.thearcticinstitute.org\/india-arctic-security-dimension-thought-through-remedial-process-address-insecurity\/<\/a>. Accessed on 4 November 2024; The Malacca Dilemma refers to the potential for the US or Indian navies to blockade or significantly disrupt China\u2019s sea lines of communication (SLOC) in the Indian Ocean, extending beyond the Strait of Malacca and other regional chokepoints. Given that the vast majority of China\u2019s both inbound and outbound trade pass through the Malacca Strait, Beijing will face severe economic repercussions could arise if US and its partners can successfully restrict, let alone block, passage.<\/td><\/tr>
\u219133<\/a><\/th>Devyatkin, P (2023) Arctic Exceptionalism: A Narrative of Cooperation and Conflict from Gorbachev to Medvedev and Putin, Polar Journal<\/em> 13, no. 2: 336\u2013357; \u00d8sthagen, A (2023) The Arctic after Russia\u2019s Invasion of Ukraine: The Increased Risk of Conflict and Hybrid Threats. Available from https:\/\/www.hybridcoe.fi\/publications\/hybrid-coe-paper-18-the-arctic-after-russias-invasion-of-ukraine-the-increased-risk-of-conflict-and-hybrid-threats\/<\/a>. Accessed on 4 November 2024<\/td><\/tr>
\u219134<\/a><\/th>Lipunov, N and Devyatkin, P (2023) The Arctic in the 2023 Russian Foreign Policy Concept. Available from https:\/\/www.thearcticinstitute.org\/arctic-2023-russian-foreign-policy-concept\/<\/a>. Accessed on 1 November 2024<\/td><\/tr>
\u219135,<\/a> \u219136<\/a><\/th>Gustafsson, P (2021) Russia\u2019s Ambitions in the Arctic Towards 2035. Available from https:\/\/www.foi.se\/en\/foi\/research\/security-policy\/russia-and-eurasia.html<\/a>. Accessed on 1 November 2024<\/td><\/tr>
\u219137<\/a><\/th>Haseen, A and Dash, M (2024) Arctic: The Next Frontier in India-Russia Relations. Available from https:\/\/infobrics.org\/post\/42939\/<\/a>. Accessed on 18 December 2024<\/td><\/tr>
\u219138<\/a><\/th>Raspotnik, A and Khorrami, N (2022) Forced to Look East? Russia, China, India, and the Future of Arctic Governance. Available from https:\/\/gjia.georgetown.edu\/2022\/09\/16\/forced-to-look-east-russia-china-india-and-the-future-of-arctic-governance\/<\/a>. Accessed on 1 November 2024<\/td><\/tr>
\u219139<\/a><\/th>Laruelle, M (2010) Russia Facing China and India in Central Asia: Cooperation, Competition, and Hesitations in China and India in Central Asia: A New \u201cGreat Game\u201d?, ed (2010) Laruelle, M, Huchet, J, F, Peyrouse, S, and Balci, B. New York: Palgrave Macmillan<\/td><\/tr>
\u219140<\/a><\/th>\u00d8sthagen, A (2020) The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Three Levels of Arctic Geopolitics in The Arctic and World Order, ed. Hamilton, D, S and Moyer, J (2020) New York: Brookings Institution Press<\/td><\/tr>
\u219141<\/a><\/th>Winther, I, N and \u00d8sthagen, A (2024) The Big Picture of Arctic Geopolitics: An actor-oriented analysis. Available from https:\/\/www.fni.no\/getfile.php\/1318301-1706208108\/Filer\/Publikasjoner\/FNI Report 1 2024.pdf<\/a>. Accessed on 10 December 2024; NATO (2024) Washington Summit Declaration. Available from https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/official_texts_227678.htm<\/a>. Accessed on 10 December 2024<\/td><\/tr>
\u219142<\/a><\/th>Kjell\u00e9n, O (2022) The Russian Northern Fleet and the (Re)militarisation of the Arctic,\u201d Arctic Review on Law and Politics<\/em>, 13: 34\u201352<\/td><\/tr>
\u219143<\/a><\/th>Winther, I, N and \u00d8sthagen, A (2024) The Big Picture of Arctic Geopolitics: An actor-oriented analysis. Available from https:\/\/www.fni.no\/getfile.php\/1318301-1706208108\/Filer\/Publikasjoner\/FNI Report 1 2024.pdf<\/a>. Accessed on 10 December 2024<\/td><\/tr>
\u219144<\/a><\/th>Ministry of Defence, Government of India (2023) Exercise Yudh Abhyas-23 Set to Commence in Fort Wainwright, Alaska, USA \u2013 Indian Contingent Departs. Available from https:\/\/pib.gov.in\/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1960137<\/a>. Accessed on 10 December 2024<\/td><\/tr>
\u219145<\/a><\/th>Alongside the Himadri research station in the Ny-\u00c5lesund base in Svalbard in Norway, India has two research stations in Antarctica, the Bharati and Maitri<\/td><\/tr>
\u219146,<\/a> \u219147<\/a><\/th>Sharma, B (2021) High Time for India\u2019s First Polar Research Vessel. Available from https:\/\/aseemamag.com\/high-time-for-indias-first-polar-research-vessel\/<\/a>. Accessed on 1 November 2024<\/td><\/tr>
\u219148<\/a><\/th>Singh, A and \u00d8sthagen, A (2024) India\u2019s Arctic Imperative. Available from https:\/\/www.thehindu.com\/opinion\/op-ed\/indias-arctic-imperative\/article68067583.ece<\/a>. Accessed on 8 December 2024<\/td><\/tr>
\u219149<\/a><\/th>Srivastava, V (2023) Why Indian Scientists Are on a Winter Voyage to the Arctic. Available from https:\/\/www.nature.com\/articles\/d44151-023-00203-z<\/a>. Accessed on 1 November 2024<\/td><\/tr>
\u219150<\/a><\/th>The Svalbard Treaty (1920). Retrieved from https:\/\/www.jus.uio.no\/english\/services\/library\/treaties\/01\/1-11\/svalbard-treaty.html<\/a><\/td><\/tr>
\u219151<\/a><\/th>Graczyk, P and Rottem, S, V (2020) The Arctic Council: Soft Actions, Hard Effects? in Routledge Handbook of Arctic Security, ed. Gj\u00f8rv, G, H, Lanteigne, M, and Sam-Aggrey, H (2020) Abingdon, UK: Routledge<\/td><\/tr>
\u219152<\/a><\/th>\u00d8sthagen, A (2013) The European Union \u2013 An Arctic Actor? Journal of Military and Strategic Studies<\/em> 15, no. 2: 71-92<\/td><\/tr>
\u219153<\/a><\/th>Jiang, Y (2014) China\u2019s Role in Arctic Affairs in the Context of Global Governance, Strategic Analysis<\/em> 38, no. 6: 913\u2013916<\/td><\/tr>
\u219154<\/a><\/th>See<\/em> for example Bisen, A (2024) Arctic Geopolitics and Governance: An Indian Perspective. Available from https:\/\/www.eastwestcenter.org\/publications\/arctic-geopolitics-and-governance-indian-perspective<\/a>. Accessed on 1 November 2024 or Panda, J (2022) Europe\u2019s Pivot to India: Examining India\u2019s NATO Calculus amid China\u2019s Fall from Grace. Available from https:\/\/trendsresearch.org\/insight\/europes-pivot-to-india-examining-indias-nato-calculus-amid-chinas-fall-from-grace\/<\/a>. Accessed on 1 November 2024<\/td><\/tr>
\u219155<\/a><\/th>Bisen, A (2024) Arctic Geopolitics and Governance: An Indian Perspective. Available from https:\/\/www.eastwestcenter.org\/publications\/arctic-geopolitics-and-governance-indian-perspective<\/a>. Accessed on 1 November 2024<\/td><\/tr>
\u219156<\/a><\/th>Mohan, C, R (2024) India\u2019s New Alignment: \u201cNon-West\u201d but Not \u201cAnti-West\u201d. Available from https:\/\/www.isas.nus.edu.sg\/papers\/indias-new-alignment-non-west-but-not-anti-west\/<\/a>. Accessed on 2 November 2024<\/td><\/tr>
\u219157<\/a><\/th>Edvardsen, A (2023) Russia Wants to Cooperate With BRICS Countries on Research on Svalbard. Available from https:\/\/www.highnorthnews.com\/en\/russia-wants-cooperate-brics-countries-research-svalbard<\/a>. Accessed on 2 November 2024<\/td><\/tr>
\u219158<\/a><\/th>Nilsen, T (2024) Arctic Russian airbase \u201cundoubtedly on radar of Ukrainian armed forces, expert says. Available from https:\/\/www.thebarentsobserver.com\/security\/arctic-russian-airbase-undoubtedly-on-radar-of-ukrainian-armed-forces-expert-says\/163870<\/a>. Accessed on 2 November 2024<\/td><\/tr>
\u219161<\/a><\/th>Lau, S (2024) China Won\u2019t Like the Sound of EU Commissioner Hearings. Here\u2019s Why. Available from https:\/\/www.politico.eu\/article\/eu-commission-braces-tougher-relationship-china-trade-kaja-kallas\/<\/a> 10 November 2024<\/td><\/tr>
\u219162<\/a><\/th>Panda, J (2022) Europe\u2019s Pivot to India: Examining India\u2019s NATO Calculus amid China\u2019s Fall from Grace. Available from https:\/\/trendsresearch.org\/insight\/europes-pivot-to-india-examining-indias-nato-calculus-amid-chinas-fall-from-grace\/<\/a>. Accessed on 1 November 2024<\/td><\/tr>
\u219163<\/a><\/th>Krastev, I and Leonard, M (2024) The meaning of sovereignty: Ukrainian and European views of Russia\u2019s war on Ukraine. Available from https:\/\/ecfr.eu\/publication\/the-meaning-of-sovereignty-ukrainian-and-european-views-of-russias-war-on-ukraine\/<\/a>. Accessed on 10 November 2024<\/td><\/tr>
\u219164,<\/a> \u219165<\/a><\/th>H\u00f6kmark, G and Oksanen, P (2024) United We Stand. Available from https:\/\/frivarld.se\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/01\/Frivarld-UnitedWeStand.pdf<\/a>. Accessed on 10 November 2024<\/td><\/tr>
\u219166<\/a><\/th>Roy, S (2024) US Puts 19 Indian Firms on Sanctions List, Says Helped Russia With Materials, Tech. Available from https:\/\/indianexpress.com\/article\/india\/us-sanction-indian-firm-supplies-russian-companies-9647140\/<\/a>. Accessed on 12 November 2024<\/td><\/tr>
\u219167<\/a><\/th>Sevastopulo, D, Hille, K, and McMorrow, R (2024) Chinese Sanctions Hit US Drone Maker Supplying Ukraine. Available from https:\/\/www.ft.com\/content\/b1104594-5da7-4b9a-b635-e7a80ab68fad<\/a>. Accessed on 12 November 2024<\/td><\/tr>
\u219168<\/a><\/th>Singh, A, I (2021) Realpolitik Defines India\u2013Russia Bilateral Ties. Available from https:\/\/rusi.org\/explore-our-research\/publications\/commentary\/realpolitik-defines-india-russia-bilateral-ties<\/a>. Accessed on 1 November 2024<\/td><\/tr>
\u219169<\/a><\/th>Bajpaee, C (2024) Managing a Managed Decline: The Future of Indian Russian Relations. Available from https:\/\/warontherocks.com\/2024\/02\/managing-a-managed-decline-the-future-of-indian-russian-relations\/<\/a>. Accessed on 12 November 2024<\/td><\/tr>
\u219170<\/a><\/th>Mosolova, D and Stognei, A (2024) Russian Arms Firm Warns It May Halt Exports as Ukraine War Demands Surge. Available from https:\/\/www.ft.com\/content\/b81b340d-3b24-4c90-81d3-e29e281f85f7<\/a>. Accessed on 12 November 2024<\/td><\/tr>
\u219171<\/a><\/th>Kaushik, K (2024) India Pivots Away From Russian Arms, But Will Retain Strong Ties. Available from https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/india\/india-pivots-away-russian-arms-will-retain-strong-ties-2024-01-28\/<\/a>. Accessed on 12 November 2024<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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