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Geopolitical shadows from East and West<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 had a seismic effect on Arctic Council cooperation: The seven other member states decided to put their work in the Arctic Council on pause, and in the aftermath, Russia chose to withdraw from the Barents Euro-Arctic Council while threatening to do the same in the Arctic Council.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Since the pause in March 2022, cooperation has gradually been restarted: first in June 2022, when the working group projects without Russian participation \u2013 approximately 70 out of 140 \u2013 were resumed, and subsequently under the Norwegian chairship, when there has been a steady increase \u2013 though still limited \u2013 of interactions at the official level as well as the resumption of more substantial cooperation in the six working groups.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The new regional realities have also changed Russia\u2019s approach to China\u2019s Arctic ambitions. Whereas Moscow was previously skeptical about welcoming Beijing into Arctic governance, it is now more open and approachable. We have seen this concretely in increased economic cooperation, remarkable coast guard cooperation and joint statements from Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin about wanting to strengthen cooperation in the Arctic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
If we look to the west, there are also dark clouds on the horizon, which portend another challenge for the Arctic Council: Donald Trump\u2019s USA. During President Trump\u2019s first term, we saw how then-Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, spoke harshly against China and Russia, and did not share the other member states\u2019 view that human activities are the main driver behind climate change and pose an existential threat. This resulted in the Finnish chairship failing to conclude a joint declaration in 2019, which was the first time in the history of the Arctic Council.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Donald Trump\u2019s persistent interest in Greenland may also prove to be a serious challenge for the chairship during the next two years. While the threat, on the one hand, may bring Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands closer together, there is also an increased risk of American attempts to create discord in the realm<\/a>. Thus, Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands are under a historically high cross-pressure, which transforms the chairship from being a big task to an enormous one.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Norway\u2019s chairship in 2023-2025 has managed to balance the situation and keep the council alive by gradually ramping up its activities. For the Danish, Greenlandic and Faroese chairship to be a success, it would be wise to continue on the same path with steadily increasing activity to ensure that the council\u2019s pulse continues to beat. However, the fact that the threat now both comes from the east and <\/em>the west makes the balancing act historically difficult.<\/p>\n\n\n\n One opportunity for increasing activity is to further enhance the focus on the rights of Indigenous peoples in the Arctic \u2013 which the new chairship program<\/a>, indeed, prioritizes \u2013 in order to strengthen regional cooperation without necessarily having to compromise on condemning Russia. If the situation allows, something as ambitious as a binding agreement on increased protection of Indigenous peoples\u2019 rights in the Arctic<\/a> would be worth striving for, similar to the council\u2019s three existing agreements<\/a> on aeronautical and maritime search and rescue (2011), marine oil pollution preparedness and response (2013), and enhancing international Arctic scientific cooperation (2017).<\/p>\n\n\n\n It may not sound like something Trump would want a stake in, but there is a chance that the Arctic Council does not have his attention whatsoever due to its limited activity \u2013 and because there are plenty of other things that keep him occupied. If that is the case, it may actually prove to be an advantage for the Arctic Council, which under normal circumstances would otherwise strengthen its relevance if meetings were prioritized by the highest political level. However, its current fragile existence and the crucial challenges make increased activity and regional consensus the overriding success criteria. In this light, it may be beneficial if State Secretary Marco Rubio is not at the table.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The chairship\u2019s level of ambition is therefore closely linked to how relations with Russia in the east and the US in the west unfold in the coming period, and here it is extra important that the other member states stand together. Only in this way can we ensure that the Arctic Council continues to exist so that regional environmental problems and sustainable development are not overshadowed by military rumble and great power competition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Whereas Russia\u2019s role has been a ubiquitous topic in the Arctic political discourse, the internal dynamics between Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands have also played a major role in the debate about their common chairship.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Two topics have especially influenced this debate: First, there has been disagreement between T\u00f3rshavn and Nuuk about whether the Faroe Islands\u2019 self-characterization as \u2018an Arctic people\u2019 is an indirect attack on Greenland\u2019s national identity and privileged negotiating position in the Arctic. Second, Greenland has actively used the fact that Denmark\u2019s status as an Arctic state depends on Greenland\u2019s geographical location and membership of the Realm<\/a> to expand its foreign policy room for manoeuvre. With this in mind, Greenland\u2019s leading diplomats have long worked for Greenland to be the lead dog in the joint delegation to the Arctic Council.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Their work eventually resulted in a new agreement ensuring that the Kingdom of Denmark\u2019s Arctic Ambassador is now the Greenlandic career diplomat, Kenneth H\u00f8egh, who comes directly from a position as Head of Greenland\u2019s representation in Washington D.C. During the two-year chairship, H\u00f8egh will have offices in both Nuuk and Copenhagen, while he will be chair of the eight national Senior Arctic Officials (SAO). The Faroe Islands\u2019 Gunv\u00f8r Balle is vice chair, while Denmark\u2019s Torsten Kj\u00f8lby Nielsen is the Kingdom of Denmark\u2019s national<\/em> Senior Arctic Official.<\/p>\n\n\n\n After many years of tug-of-war, it now seems that Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands have buried the hatchet regarding the division of roles during the chairship, with Greenland now occupying a very prominent role. This is important both in the short term \u2013 where they must ensure a successful chairship \u2013 and in the long term, where it is about the overarching mission of making sure that the Arctic Council survives.<\/p>\n\n\n\n There are many good reasons why the Arctic Council should survive. Here we will highlight three:<\/p>\n\n\n\n First, the involvement of Indigenous peoples as permanent participants in the council is unique in an international context. They do not have direct decision-making authority, but they are at the table and provide input \u2013 and are heard \u2013 when decisions are made. If the Arctic Council does not survive, this unique construct will fall apart, which will create a major challenge for Arctic Indigenous peoples, who are unlikely to gain the same kind of influence in another regional forum.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Second, the Arctic Council\u2019s working groups are a unique construct: Over three decades, scientists and officials have accumulated knowledge that has been incorporated into national administration and international convention work. This work has thus helped to make the rest of the world aware of the enormous climatic and environmental challenges that are extraordinarily noticeable in the Arctic, well exemplified by the average regional temperature increase which is about three times higher than the global average. Thus, the scientific work under the auspices of the Arctic Council is not only important for the region, but for the globe at large. If the Arctic Council does not survive the current crisis, these essential networks will likely collapse, and they cannot be rebuilt overnight.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The third, and related, reason is that the Arctic states and the other actors of the Council face major transboundary challenges that are best solved jointly. Be it biodiversity issues, the spread of diseases and environmental problems; the risk of the latter is only increasing in step with the heightened activities in the region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n At the moment, it is of course politically and morally difficult to cooperate with Russia, while the Trump administration\u2019s approach to Greenland \u2013 and the Arctic experiences from his first presidential term \u2013 \u200b\u200bprovide negative evidence of \u200b\u200bwhat further consequences this could have for regional cooperation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Arctic Council is in a historically difficult situation, marked by geopolitical shadows from both the East and the West. An extraordinary responsibility therefore rests on the other Arctic states \u2013 led by the new chairship \u2013 to ensure that they together address our inevitable shared fate in the North. If successful, the Arctic Council could emerge stronger on the other side.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This is a condensed, rewritten and translated version of an article in Danish, published as an introduction to a special issue about the Arctic Council. The special issue is open access via the webpage of the journal Internasjonal Politikk<\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n Marc Jacobsen<\/a> is an Associate Professor at the Royal Danish Defence College\u2019s Centre for Arctic Security Studies where he researches security politics and diplomacy in the Arctic. Marc was also a Member \u2013 in various positions \u2013 of The Arctic Institute between 2013 and 2020. He recently co-edited the book \u2018Greenland in Arctic Security\u2019 which is available via open access here<\/a>. Svein Vigeland Rottem<\/a> is a Senior Researcher at Fridtjof Nansen Institute where he researches Arctic politics and the Arctic Council. He has published a number of peer reviewed articles and books on these issues. He has also organized several events at conferences like Arctic Circle and Arctic Frontiers.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" With the gavel comes an extraordinary responsibility to ensure the council\u2019s survival in a historically difficult time, when geopolitical tensions cast long shadows over regional cooperation.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":3018,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"rop_custom_images_group":[],"rop_custom_messages_group":[],"rop_publish_now":"initial","rop_publish_now_accounts":[],"rop_publish_now_history":[],"rop_publish_now_status":"pending","_themeisle_gutenberg_block_has_review":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[6],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3017","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-cooperation"],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/arcticwatch.info\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3017","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/arcticwatch.info\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/arcticwatch.info\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/arcticwatch.info\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/arcticwatch.info\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3017"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/arcticwatch.info\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3017\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3019,"href":"https:\/\/arcticwatch.info\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3017\/revisions\/3019"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/arcticwatch.info\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/3018"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/arcticwatch.info\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3017"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/arcticwatch.info\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3017"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/arcticwatch.info\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3017"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}The need for increased council activity<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Have Nuuk, Copenhagen and T\u00f3rshavn buried the hatchet?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Three reasons why the Arctic Council must survive<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Our inevitable shared fate in the North<\/h2>\n\n\n\n