The \u201cHigh North, low tension\u201d and \u201cexceptional Arctic\u201d mantras are increasingly outdated. Since the 1987 Murmansk Initiative,4<\/a><\/sup> the logic of \u201cArctic exceptionalism\u201d relied on stakeholders focusing on cooperative governance. Underlying drivers of insecurity, including adversarial and competitive geopolitical dynamics, were always present, if hidden. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Climate change<\/strong> adds complexity.5<\/a><\/sup> On top of diminished ice coverage, submarine operations \u2014 from torpedo launches to hydro-acoustics \u2014 are challenged by changes in seawater quality and salinity.6<\/a><\/sup> Boreal wildfires also require military assistance to aid overrun civilian responses. Most importantly, climate change means more physical access to the Arctic across all domains. As the civilian (e.g., commercial shipping, resource extraction, fishing, tourism) and military (e.g., standing forces and constabulary operations) presence increases in Arctic waters and skies, more incidents and accidents will undeniably happen \u2014 especially risks linked to environmental degradation due to environmental catastrophes and human-made disasters (especially radioactive waste management in Russia).7<\/a><\/sup> Unfortunately, the most affected are likely to be local and Indigenous communities.8<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n Russia<\/strong> began reinvesting in Arctic affairs in the mid-2000s.9<\/a><\/sup> The Kremlin remains adamant in asserting complete control over the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation (AZRF), extending defense in depth through interdiction capabilities away from the Russian Arctic, and protecting perceived vital interests along the Northern Sea Route (NSR). Russia has been rapidly militarizing NSR approaches, especially across critical choke points,10<\/a><\/sup> and modernizing local infrastructure.11<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n Under the impact of climate change, more waters and coastlines in and close to the AZRF and the NSR are becoming accessible. In Moscow\u2019s calculations, receding sea ice coverage means that the once \u201cnatural\u201d border no longer offers sufficient protection. The Kremlin consequently fears that the US and NATO will soon increase surface, subsurface, and air deployments closer to the AZRF. This situation is fraught with miscalculation and tactical errors that could lead to dangerous escalation with global consequences.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This fear has been amplified by Sweden\u2019s and Finland\u2019s NATO accession, fueling a sense of encirclement12<\/a><\/sup> and vulnerability.13<\/a><\/sup> Ukrainian drone strikes on the Olenya air base,14<\/a><\/sup> home to strategic aviation assets, in July 2024, raises the question of how potent Russia\u2019s multilayered defense capabilities truly are.<\/p>\n\n\n\n China<\/strong>\u2019s approach to Arctic security is very different. The self-aggrandizing \u201cnear-Arctic\u201d state proclamation in 201815<\/a><\/sup> prompted a diplomatic backlash and forced China into \u201ctactical retreat.\u201d16<\/a><\/sup> Beijing\u2019s approach to the Arctic is linked to resource access diversification as part of the Belt and Road Initiative for fossil energy, rare earths, and fishing stocks. China is hoping to impose more Beijing-friendly governance rules for regional access and resource exploitation.17<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n Chinese Arctic activities must be understood as fundamentally dual-purpose. Its military presence in the Arctic has thus far remained limited but suspicions arise that scientific research presence feeds intelligence and domain awareness18<\/a><\/sup> \u2014 not least to bridge China\u2019s learning curve in cold weather operations. China is also managing a fleet of polar-specific satellites as part of the BeiDou system and investing in modern satellite technology.19<\/a><\/sup> It plans to deploy a large-scale network of dual-use listening devices in the Arctic Ocean20<\/a><\/sup> as part of the Underwater Great Wall21<\/a><\/sup> \u2014 all of which could be used for military purposes. Suspicions also abound that Beijing is seeking to increase its military footprint in the Arctic,22<\/a><\/sup> notably with the People\u2019s Liberation Army Navy, to sustain its strategic ambitions, and its commercial presence with the Transpolar Sea Route and future resource exploitation.23<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n Russia and China<\/strong> have been displaying symbolic attempts at closer Arctic cooperation \u2014 such as the signature in April 2023 of a memorandum of understanding strengthening cooperation between the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Border Service (Coast Guard and Border Guard) and the Chinese Coast Guard24<\/a><\/sup> \u2014 although the agreement is not Arctic specific. They are also conducting a growing number of joint aerial exercises and patrols close to the Pacific Arctic, such as near the Japanese,25<\/a><\/sup> South Korean,26<\/a><\/sup> and Alaskan27<\/a><\/sup> air defense identification zones (ADIZs), as well as joint maritime drills,28<\/a><\/sup> including close to the Aleutian Islands and off the US exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the Bering Sea.29<\/a><\/sup> However, such bilateral cooperation has remained mostly symbolic and politically valuable \u2014 not least because these efforts retain Western attention and lead to exaggerations about their significance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Overall, Sino-Russian Arctic interactions are characterized chiefly by friction and mistrust rather than partnership.30<\/a><\/sup> As in energy or economic development, the deepening of bilateral defense and military cooperation in the Arctic is shadowed by each country\u2019s long-term objectives in governance and security. Greater Chinese activity may lead to a \u201cstrategic culture clash.\u201d31<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n Against this picture, US and allied presence<\/strong> is still lacking. Though the Arctic is no longer a blind spot for the United States, persistent gaps in critical capabilities prevent complete domain awareness. These include<\/p>\n\n\n\n Command-and-control responsibilities still overlap among US commands, NATO structures, and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). More fundamentally, the United States, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Finland, known as the Arctic 7, do not fully agree in their approach to the region \u2014 especially in terms of diverging national views on circumpolar security, what constitutes defense priorities, and geographical priorities across the Arctic theater.<\/p>\n\n\n\n As the Arctic continues to open, the security challenges will deepen. The Arctic 7 must prevent a genuine return of a Cold War\u2013style \u201cstrategic Arctic.\u201d32<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n This paper closely follows the release of recent US strategic documents related to the Arctic \u2014 namely the 2022 \u201cNational Strategy for the Arctic Region\u201d (NSAR),33<\/a><\/sup> the 2023 implementation plan for the NSAR,34<\/a><\/sup> and the US Department of Defense\u2019s (DoD\u2019s) \u201c2024 Arctic Strategy.\u201d35<\/a><\/sup> It places these documents in the context of changing geostrategic dynamics in the Arctic and offers policymakers ways forward in approaching the role and place of NATO in the region, discussions on Arctic military security affairs, Arctic-specific deterrence, and the development of modern technology for future circumpolar security.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Future US, NATO, and allied policy toward the Arctic must ensure that the region remains stable and predictable. Many unknowns remain, including the role and place of NATO in Arctic military security affairs and governance frameworks. Policy must determine NATO\u2019s Arctic future, streamline US priorities, and envision a dedicated military security architecture for the region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO is geographically and strategically putting more emphasis on the Northern dimension of the Atlantic alliance. The de factocreation of the \u201cNATO Arctic 7\u201d36<\/a><\/sup> also strengthens the link between the Baltic Sea theater and the European High North, especially considering strategic competition with Russia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n If, on paper, NATO represents a good framework for circumpolar military cooperation among the Arctic 7, two main unknowns remain:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Some commentators have rightly pointed out that NATO has always been an Arctic alliance.37<\/a><\/sup> Indeed, the Cold War saw a high level of competition and contestation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and NATO and its allies in an Arctic environment \u2014 from circumpolar subsea warfare to nuclear testing in Russia\u2019s Arctic and the threat of strategic bomber overflights through North Pole approaches. With the recent inclusion of Sweden and Finland in the alliance, there is now equally more Arctic in NATO and more NATO in the Arctic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For the past few years, NATO\u2019s Arctic efforts and footprint have grown, such as with the activation of Joint Force Command (JFC) Norfolk in 2018 under Allied Command Operations, the recent joint operational coordination mechanisms between NATO\u2019s Maritime Command and the Danish Joint Arctic Command,38<\/a><\/sup> and other efforts coordinated through NATO Allied Command Transformation.39<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n A genuine \u201cArctic awakening\u201d within NATO structures still awaits. The alliance has an opportunity to properly define its regional role as well as calibrate Arctic policy among allies. The main objective is to determine NATO\u2019s exact perimeter of operation in the region while establishing deterrence against competitors,40<\/a><\/sup> but without overtly escalating or militarizing Arctic discussions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n NATO and its allies must fundamentally answer the question of how much NATO is needed and necessary in the Arctic. Geographically, this means not only North Atlantic approaches and sea lines of communication (SLOC), but \u201cnorth of the North Atlantic\u201d in the European High North, through North Pole approaches, and further out in the Pacific Arctic for US and Canadian homeland defense \u2014 in other words, achieving genuine transarctic defense.<\/p>\n\n\n\n NATO should avoid approaching the Arctic by thinking through the usual prism of regional flanks or by compartmentalizing the region into a specific area of operation or domain. Because of geography, the Arctic spans multiple theaters, creating an integrated strategic continuum from the European High North to the Pacific Arctic, with North Pole approaches in between, that goes beyond NATO\u2019s usual remit. Comprehensive regional security for the alliance encompasses a wide range of issues and discussions, especially for North American and North Pacific defense.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Commentators have been calling for a NATO strategy in the Arctic.41<\/a><\/sup> Such a move might be premature \u2014 not least to avoid an overlap among existing command structures. More than a \u201cstrategy\u201d or an \u201cArctic command,\u201d NATO must first find its credible voice42<\/a><\/sup> in circumpolar security as well as internally build its Arctic dimension and framework of operations. Unfortunately, the final declaration of the 2024 NATO Summit in Washington did not mention the Arctic as an area of interest.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Before having a properly defined strategy for the Arctic, NATO first needs an operational roadmap in terms of presence and capabilities. It should start by strengthening internal awareness of Arctic affairs as well as taking stock of existing endeavors and streamlining them under one umbrella.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A second step would be to discuss with partners and allies the most organic role and place for NATO in Arctic military security affairs. This should avoid overlapping with existing regional endeavors such as the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable, the Arctic Chiefs of Defence Staff meetings, Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO), the UK-led ten-country Joint Expeditionary Force, or the newly created Arctic Security Policy Roundtable.43<\/a><\/sup> The goal would be to achieve a genuine transatlantic perspective on circumpolar security44<\/a><\/sup> while bridging diverging views on Arctic security. Such initial work will help determine what gaps NATO could potentially fill.<\/p>\n\n\n\n NATO\u2019s role and place in Arctic military security affairs must be caveated by a thorough discussion on the limits of NATO\u2019s regional presence. Indeed, the alliance should not monopolize the debate on regional hard security issues, nor should it be the sole and only arena of discussion. NATO must find an appropriate balance between minimal presence and over-militarizing Arctic affairs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cToo much\u201d NATO would essentially strengthen Moscow\u2019s \u201cbesieged fortress\u201d mentality45<\/a><\/sup> \u2014 with the greater risk of increasing miscalculation, tactical errors, and unintended escalation.46<\/a><\/sup> Should NATO\u2019s capabilities and footprint expand in the region, members of the alliance must accept the potential for regional escalation. As NATO is going through an adjustment period about its role and place in the Arctic, information sharing among allies and partners will be key to success.<\/p>\n\n\n\n So far, Nordic members of NATO have agreed to strengthen the land component of the alliance. In June 2024, Norway, Finland, and Sweden announced the establishment of a trilateral military transport corridor to streamline logistics and resupplies across the High North.47<\/a><\/sup> The same month, alliance Ministers of Defense greenlighted the establishment of the Multi Corps Land Component Command as well as Forward Land Forces in Finland.48<\/a><\/sup> Under JFC Norfolk, the new land command will host the multinational battle group, initially with Finland, Norway, and Sweden. These initiatives, and others to come, will steadily pave the way to an integrated NATO policy for the Arctic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Another set of issues NATO must approach is the exact perimeter of Arctic operations and the internal division of labor among command structures, military forces, and Arctic-specific concepts of operation. Even though the Arctic region remains peripheral in NATO thinking, it is now taking up more space, especially from a maritime command point of view. The exact division of labor remains undetermined but will shape NATO\u2019s role in an Arctic context.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The accession of Sweden and Finland impacts how NATO should approach command and control (C2) organization as well as the future force model and structure for the Arctic.36<\/a><\/sup> The debate on C2 organization must consider the balance between Arctic and Baltic security \u2014 in command structure terms, between JFC Norfolk and JFC Brunssum. Further policy planning is something Nordic policymakers are particularly eager to determine as it will impact the division of responsibility and area of operation within NATO.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The debate has been somewhat closed now as Sweden and Finland will join JFC Norfolk, under US command, to streamline North Atlantic and potentially Arctic operations. Yet the exact perimeter of interaction with JFC Brunssum remains to be determined. These boundaries between both JFCs need to be clear and understood early in the process to ensure that they can act effectively in a potential crisis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n An important aspect of the discussion relates to the interconnection between NATO and NORAD. NORAD modernization must go hand in hand with further integration and cooperation with NATO structures49<\/a><\/sup> \u2014 not least because the Supreme Allied Commander Europe\u2019s area of responsibility (AoR) blends into NORAD\u2019s and vice versa.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A final aspect of the debate is the integration of US command structures within NATO in an Arctic context. As more dialogue and information sharing will be necessary among allies, the US must find appropriate ways to streamline the different commands responsible for various aspects of Arctic operations \u2014 Northern Command (NORTHCOM), European Command (EUCOM), Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) \u2014 and coordinate them efficiently within NATO to avoid overlaps. Of particular relevance is the interaction between US NORTHCOM and NATO JFC Norfolk in the context of NATO\u2019s Regional Plan Northwest. These aspects are clearly identified in the US DoD \u201c2024 Arctic Strategy.\u201d50<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n Overall, the NATO 7 must increase their collaborative and cohesive approach to Arctic security. This will require more information and intelligence sharing, and ultimately better coordination. NATO members must better coordinate military exercises and strategic communication around Arctic operations. For instance, US NORTHCOM\u2019s Arctic Edge,51<\/a><\/sup> Canada\u2019s Operation Nanook,52<\/a><\/sup> and NATO\u2019s Cold\/Nordic Response exercises took place within weeks of each other, yet with a striking and regrettable lack of coordination.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Another key question relates to finding the balance of response between national and collective defense in an Arctic context. Since the Arctic is a question of homeland security for circumpolar states, there is a need to expand it to layered, allied defense in an integrated way.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A final question pertains to broader human presence and forward deployments. In a NATO context, forces will have to focus on deployment agility and sustainability, but not necessarily on permanent regional presence. Recent NATO drills have already identified several vulnerabilities in operating in a cold weather environment.53<\/a><\/sup> Future work must also consider interfacing with the Centre of Excellence for Cold Weather Operations54<\/a><\/sup> in Norway as well as with the Joint Expeditionary Force, led by the United Kingdom (UK), which could become a spearhead force for Arctic operations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Arctic training must deepen at the NATO level, with the caveat that the alliance must find a balance between training for <\/em>Arctic conditions without always being present in<\/em> the Arctic.45<\/a><\/sup> The recently renamed annual Nordic Response exercise will become the staple of NATO\u2019s Arctic coordination in the years to come55<\/a><\/sup> as it includes Arctic states and key partners such as the UK and the Netherlands. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Since the early 2020s, a flurry of Arctic-related strategic documents and actions in the United States \u2014 from the 2022 NSAR,56<\/a><\/sup> the 2023 implementation plan for the NSAR,57<\/a><\/sup> the creation of the DoD Arctic Strategy and Global Resilience Office,58<\/a><\/sup> and the release of the 2024 DoD Arctic strategy50<\/a><\/sup> \u2014 has successfully enshrined the Arctic as an area of vital importance for the US in terms of homeland defense, cooperation with allies, and regional stability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Arctic security, beyond Alaska and NORAD, is no longer a blind spot for the United States. In military security affairs, the DoD 2024 strategy will allow for the implementation and resourcing of the security pillar of the NSAR. Understanding is growing that wider Arctic security directly impacts homeland defense, not least in the face of increased Russian and Chinese competition.59<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n The US must avoid being a bystanderin the wider Arctic and rather focus on having a global perspective regarding presence and access to the region. This would entail better connections and communication \u2014 especially around strategic exercises and readiness. The 2024 DoD strategy clearly outlines that NORTHCOM is and will remain the key Arctic capability advocate.60<\/a><\/sup> as part of the Unified Command Plan and Total Force.<\/p>\n\n\n\n To that end, bilaterally, the US expanded its agreement (DCA) with Norway and entered into DCAs with Finland and Sweden in 2024.61<\/a><\/sup> These agreements are critical for partnership including access to basing for US military personnel and pre-positioning of military materiel. These three DCAs will allow for more than 40 locations with US military access, including 15 in the north of each of these countries.62<\/a><\/sup> They solidify critical capacity and capability as the region and alliance continue to strengthen their presence, deterrence, and defense. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Further coordination with EUCOM (North Atlantic AoR) and INDOPACOM (military assets and troops in Alaska) will also be necessary to prevent further overlap in responsibilities and deployments. Another coordination aspect is between the US 2nd and 6th Fleets with EUCOM and NATO\u2019s JFC Norfolk.36<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n Moving forward, US stakeholders must identify key priorities for capabilities and procurement of Arctic-enabled systems. Despite budget constraints, the US government can better calibrate efforts internally as well as with NATO allies and beyond. An important first step is to match capabilities with operational design for cold weather operations and future presence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Since 2020, successive strategic documents released by the US armed services have helped identify capabilities gaps that have been streamlined under the 2022 NSAR and the 2024 DoD Arctic strategy.63<\/a><\/sup> To fill the \u201cicebreaker gap,\u201d a major part of procurement is the extension of the Polar Security Cutter program for the US Coast Guard64<\/a><\/sup> and the upcoming Arctic Security Cutter program.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the context of the US Army\u2019s 2021 \u201cRegaining Arctic Dominance\u201dstrategy,65<\/a><\/sup> the reactivation of the 11th Airborne Division in 202266<\/a><\/sup> is a positive step to tune US forces into Arctic operations. The goal is to turn the Alaskan division into an Arctic-capable force by design that can be rapidly deployed across the circumpolar theater and beyond \u2014 including expeditionary multidomain operations in the Indo-Pacific theater.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Decisions to reactivate the Navy 2nd Fleet as part of NATO\u2019s JFC Norfolk,67<\/a><\/sup> increase airlift capabilities at the Keflav\u00edk airfield in Iceland,68<\/a><\/sup> and expand F-35 presence at the Eielson air base in Alaska69<\/a><\/sup> are also positive steps forward in fulfilling US regional strategy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Through permanent and rotational deployments, the US approach to Arctic \u201ccalibrated presence\u201d70<\/a><\/sup> is considering a form of \u201cagile basing\u201d through modular forward operating presence. One issue remains, however, in terms of division of labor, notably with Canada. For instance, if US troops in Alaska under INDOPACOM are drawn out to the Asia-Pacific theater, this will automatically increase pressure on Canada to have a greater regional security role to defend North American approaches.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Finally, as part of the \u201cmonitor and respond\u201d approach, the 2024 DoD Arctic strategy and the 2022 NSAR emphasize the need to exercise presence in the Arctic independently and alongside allies. Presence will be further established through continued cycles of training and drills in the US and within a NATO context.50<\/a><\/sup> US Arctic operations will focus specifically on circumpolar security choke points such as the Bering Strait and the Greenland\u2013Iceland\u2013United Kingdom (GIUK) and Greenland-Iceland-Norway (GIN) gaps.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Arctic needs a dedicated military security architecture.71<\/a><\/sup> Expert discussions before the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine considered key factors that could help the Arctic 7 outline what a military security architecture would look like.72<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n Since 2014, Russia\u2019s war against Ukraine has dented the ability of Arctic-related governance frameworks to carry out their missions and kindle the spirit of \u201clow tension.\u201d With circumpolar governance at risk of a geopolitical takeover, a predictable and transparent military security framework in the Arctic is needed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The need for a designated military security architecture is compounded by risks of miscalculation and tactical errors between the Arctic 7 and Russia. With more human presence across the region, the potential for accidents and incidents will undoubtedly increase. Left unchecked and in the absence of clear lines of communication and deconfliction with Moscow, such events carry the risk of (un)intended escalation.73<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n Furthermore, even though Russia has little incentive to voluntarily escalate in the Arctic, restraint and transparency cannot be taken for granted. Past Arctic incidents no longer offer a benchmark of the Kremlin\u2019s behavior in crisis situations.74<\/a><\/sup> Russian leadership has also not been transparent regarding recent serious environmental catastrophes (for instance, the 2019 Nyonoksa radiological incident, the 2020 Norilsk spill, and the 2021 Siberian wildfires).<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Arctic 7 must bridge diverging national views on circumpolar security. If all Arctic NATO countries now recognize that Russia represents a security threat to the region, they lack an integrated view on what constitutes defense and security priorities within that threat environment.36<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n For instance, Russia as a circumpolar security threat conveys a different meaning and response between the European Arctic and the North American\/North Pacific Arctic.44<\/a><\/sup> Arctic security in Nordic countries, especially in Finland and Sweden, is a matter of territorial defense and a prerequisite for national security.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Geography also matters: The definition of the \u201cArctic\u201d diverges from a Canadian, American, Danish, or Finnish point of view. While Sweden and Finland focus as much on Baltic Sea and Lapland security, US and Canadian defense focus remains circumscribed within NORAD\u2019s AoR. Yet, the US and Canada also have different approaches to security in the North American Arctic \u2014 military focused for the US and \u201cdefense centric\u201d for Canada.75<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n The Arctic 7 must avoid a bifurcation between the North American NORAD-centric Arctic and the European High North. Thankfully, Arctic allies have strong complementarities \u2014 for instance, Norway\u2019s naval focus; Finland\u2019s land presence and ground forces; and North America\u2019s air defense, air power, remote sensing, and space operations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A second paramount factor is the need to obtain a common understanding of what represents acceptable, legitimate, and nonthreatening military operations at peacetime in the region. This could be achieved by creating an Arctic Military Code of Conduct (AMCC).76<\/a><\/sup> By defining the rules of the road of peacetime military activity, an AMCC would help diffuse tension and limit the risk of miscalculation. The AMCC should be extended to Russia and to all non-coastal states able to deploy and sustain military assets in the Arctic (which would undeniably include China).77<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n The AMCC would increase transparency and predictability in regional military security affairs. In terms of format, a code of conduct should remain light and noninvasive enough to avoid over-institutionalizing military security affairs in the Arctic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Finally, two caveats must be introduced about Arctic military security discussions. First, the intrusion of geopolitics and a hard security discourse in the Arctic must not take wider discussions hostage or overshadow the conversation on the impact of climate change, environmental protection, or human security in the region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Second, Arctic nations must be careful not to create overlaps with existing frameworks and cooperative endeavors touching upon regional security affairs. As noted above, many formats already deal with circumpolar security issues. An important question moving forward is to determine whether such frameworks should be completely subordinate to NATO or simply support the alliance without overlapping with it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Any discussion on hard security must avoid being over-institutionalized and streamlined within existing endeavors to prevent a \u201cmille-feuille\u201d of initiatives. The recently created Arctic Security Policy Roundtable, at the defense-policy level, will also have to interface with existing endeavors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Beyond low tension in the Arctic, what matters most in the situation is the predictability of the operating environment and transparency over regional military activities. The ultimate objective will not necessarily require building trust with Moscow, but will involve minimizing misunderstandings and therefore limiting the risk of miscalculation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Yet, as the Kremlin is now absent from existing cooperative frameworks, it could eventually be reengaged or re-invited.78<\/a><\/sup> Arctic stakeholders should ask themselves whether they fear reintegrating Russia more than accepting the collapse of the existing architecture in the Arctic. The policy corollary is to understand under which circumstances reintegrating Moscow would be an acceptable proposition for the European Arctic countries closest to Russia as well as for the United States.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Arctic stability is highly contingent upon successful deterrence against existing regional threats \u2014 from Russia\u2019s aggressive behavior to low-intensity, subthreshold destabilization efforts across critical regional choke points. The US and the Arctic 7 must determine what constitutes proper deterrence in an Arctic context, not least by exercising regional presence while preventing horizontal escalation and subthreshold operations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the European High North, the protection of the AZRF and NSR is achieved through the Soviet-inherited Bastion<\/em> defense concept. Bastion<\/em> is a multi-domain, multilayered \u201cprotective dome\u201d of air defense, sea denial, coastal defense systems, and domain awareness capabilities located along critical choke points of the AZRF.79<\/a><\/sup> It aims to heavily deny adversary military operations and degrade the operating environment at sea, in the air, and in the electromagnetic spectrum.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Bastion<\/em> is designed to ensure the safety and survivability of the sea-based, second-strike nuclear deterrent deployed with the Northern Fleet on the Kola Peninsula as well as on the Kamchatka Peninsula with the Pacific Fleet. A major concern is also the protection of the air-based nuclear deterrent that can be deployed throughout the network of bases across the AZRF, critical energy infrastructure on the Yamal Peninsula and beyond, as well as the Plesetsk Cosmodrome in the Arkhangelsk Oblast.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Beyond the AZRF, Russia is seeking to extend interdiction capabilities away from the Arctic itself and deeper into NATO and allied territories. Moscow essentially wants to create more defense in depth by extending out-of-area denial capabilities on both sides of the Arctic as well as across North Pole approaches.80<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n![\"Photo:](\"https:\/\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/180310-N-LY160-744-1024x684.jpg\")
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\n
Chapter 1: Military security affairs in a changing Arctic<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
1) The role and place of NATO in Arctic security<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
\n
How much NATO? Outlining the role and place of the alliance in Arctic military security<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
![\"\"](\"https:\/\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/53586836916_c104b2a308_o-683x1024.jpg\")
What kind of NATO? Relations with allies and command structures<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
![\"\"](\"https:\/\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/2017-03-30T000000Z_1393751890_LR1ED3U1GHXH1_RTRMADP_3_RUSSIA-MILITARY-1-1024x718.jpg\")
2) The US role and presence in the Arctic<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
![\"Photo:](\"https:\/\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/52746432152_3f15f8ec8d_o-1024x683.jpg\")
3) A framework for Arctic military security affairs<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
![\"\"](\"https:\/\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/53557424118_1659b5c8ff_o-683x1024.jpg\")
In Lapland, northern Finland, where temperatures regularly drop below -20 degrees Celsius, Finnish instructors from the Finnish Defence Forces\u2019 Jaeger Brigade run different courses for military personnel from various NATO countries. The course focuses on subjects such as using layered clothing, protecting against and treatment of injuries related to frostbite, sustaining performance capability, making fires, developing cross-country skiing skills and rescuing from the ice. In this iteration, the Basic winter course, participants came from France, the United Kingdom, the United States as well as Finland.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\nBuilding a proper security architecture<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
Caveats to Arctic military security<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
![\"Photo:](\"https:\/\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/53561392123_260c31dc42_o-1024x683.jpg\")
Chapter 2: Deterrence in an Arctic context<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
1) Deterring security threats in the Arctic<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Deterring Russia\u2019s aggressive posture<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
![\"Photo:](\"https:\/\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/2021-02-10T194954Z_1308218937_MT1TASSP44253049_RTRMADP_3_TASS-PIC-1024x709.jpg\")