0
0
But understanding how means looking beyond their partnership.
Sino-Russian Arctic cooperation is real but limited – and should not distract from the broader strategic challenges each country poses individually. While the partnership merits attention, some aspects are more symbolic than substantive, with Russia ultimately controlling the pace and direction.
Media narratives often highlight the growing alignment between China and Russia in the Arctic and the potential threat this poses to other states. Yet the partnership remains constrained by diverging priorities, Russia’s wariness of Chinese influence, and China’s reluctance to expose itself to sanctions or engage in risky ventures.
At the same time Russia’s increasing dependence on China since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has given Beijing opportunities to pursue deeper access to the Russian Arctic on its own terms and in areas that align with its long-term objectives. Rather than engaging broadly, China is selective in how and where it invests or participates – a dynamic that could intensify underlying frictions between the two even as global geopolitical shifts continue to draw them closer in the region.
Russia leads in the Arctic – but China gains from the partnership
Russia is in and of the Arctic – and developments there are urgent and core to national interests. China is patiently working its way into the region, while urgent and core interests remain elsewhere. While international law allows China to navigate, extract resources and conduct research in international waters of the Arctic, most extractable resources and infrastructure – such as ports, roads and research stations – lie within the national territories of, or in areas controlled by, the eight ‘Arctic states’, namely: Canada, Denmark (via Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States. Consequently, China relies on cooperation with these countries to access much of what the Arctic has to offer.
Since 2022 Sino-Russian Arctic cooperation has expanded into areas where Moscow was previously unwilling to allow any Chinese presence such as military and coastguard cooperation. In parallel, cooperation has intensified in domains where engagement already existed such as shipping, reaching levels that Russia had not previously been ready to accept.
While China has gained access to previously restricted areas in the Arctic through its partnership with Russia, it has not significantly expanded its overall footprint in the region during this period. This is due in part to increased scrutiny and pushback against Chinese investment in other Arctic states – a trend that began emerging some years before Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
A partnership defined by its limits
The recent deepening of Sino-Russian Arctic cooperation is largely shaped by necessity and limited alternatives and comes with considerable trade-offs for both sides, which raises questions about its long-term sustainability.
China will likely continue its strategy of selective engagement – partnering with Russia where feasible while avoiding direct exposure to sanctions.
In some domains – such as shipping and coastguard operations – institutional foundations have been laid that could enable deeper and more sustained engagement. Others, for example joint mining ventures, remain largely exploratory or at early stages of development and others still, including military drills, may be more symbolic than substantive.
Western policymakers should keep two key distinctions in mind when assessing the Sino-Russian Arctic partnership. First, that their cooperation has thus far been mostly limited to the Russian Arctic, near Russia’s own territory. Energy and shipping collaboration is centred on the Northern Sea Route and the export of oil and gas from Russian Arctic projects. Even the joint military exercises, conducted in the Bering and Chukchi Seas, have remained near Russia’s Arctic coast.
This should not be confused with any expansion into the Canadian or Greenlandic Arctic – regions far from Russian shores. Despite claims by US President Donald Trump of Chinese and Russian warships ‘all over the place’ near Greenland, no such presence has materialised. Any shift in that direction would likely trigger far greater concern from NATO, given the proximity of these areas to North America and their strategic value to the United States. The constrained nature of Sino-Russian Arctic cooperation means that Western assessments must look beyond the partnership in and of itself.
Second, it is important to distinguish between the specific risks of their cooperation and the broader, longer-term challenges posed by China and Russia individually in the Arctic. Blurring the line between these two issues risks misunderstanding both. Russia’s Arctic militarisation and provocative behaviour in sensitive areas such as Svalbard presents serious challenges independent of its relationship with China.
China’s Arctic presence beyond Russia remains limited, not only because of recent pushback but also due to its own miscalculations. For example, stalled mining projects involving Chinese companies in Greenland and Canada suggest that China may have underestimated the region’s operational and regulatory challenges, with interest already showing signs of waning before geopolitical pressure intensified during the first Trump administration (2017–2021).
Nonetheless, Beijing aspires to become a ‘Polar Great Power’ – a goal that extends well beyond its partnership with Russia – and could, over time, strain that relationship as Russia begins to view China’s growing Arctic role as a strategic threat. Though currently reliant on Russia, China poses independent challenges – military, economic, and normative – to the existing Arctic order, especially in the longer term. As it expands its regional footprint, China may increasingly seek to reshape Arctic governance by advocating both for reform of existing structures and the creation of alternative ones, likely doing so incrementally to minimise backlash.
The uncertain future of US sanctions
Looking ahead, the development of Sino-Russian Arctic cooperation will also depend on the trajectory of US sanctions. If sanctions remain or intensify, China will likely continue its strategy of selective engagement – partnering with Russia where feasible while avoiding direct exposure to sanctions.
Political uncertainty poses a major challenge for companies considering involvement in potential joint US–Russia Arctic projects.
Should sanctions be lifted or eased – an option US officials have suggested could be part of a peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine – Moscow may find itself in a stronger position to resist Chinese pressure. While efforts by the Trump Administration to drive a broader wedge between China and Russia will almost certainly fail, the Arctic could emerge as an area where Russia seeks limited cooperation with the United States to offset its growing dependence on China.
A reset between the United States and Russia would hinge on several other developments and could easily be reversed by a future US administration. This political uncertainty poses a major challenge for companies considering involvement in potential joint US–Russia Arctic projects, making such ventures very unlikely in the near term.
In the longer term, however, bilateral US–Russia cooperation on Arctic energy or mining projects cannot be ruled out. Such deals could sideline European interests, increase environmental risks for the Nordic countries and bring the United States and Russia closer on Arctic governance.
To be prepared for this possibility, Nordic countries should reassert their collective influence within the Arctic Council and expand Arctic collaboration through regional forums such as the Nordic Council of Ministers. They should also strengthen cooperation with Canada, whose environmental priorities and commitment to equal, multilateral governance among Arctic states closely align with their own.
Key trends in Sino-Russian Arctic cooperation since 2022
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and resulting isolation from the West, Sino-Russian cooperation in the Arctic has grown across several domains – though unevenly and often cautiously:
Mining: from caution to cooperation
Prior to 2022, Chinese firms were hesitant to invest in Russian Arctic mining due to political sensitivities and restrictive Russian policies. Since then cooperation has begun on lithium and titanium exploration, though these projects are still in the early stages of development.
Energy: eager Russia, hesitant China
Russia has pushed for deeper Chinese involvement in its Arctic energy projects, particularly LNG, but Chinese companies remain cautious, wary of Western sanctions. Some have even scaled back existing commitments.
Shipping: sanctions push Russia toward China
Western sanctions have disrupted Russia’s pre-2022 cooperation with European and Asian partners on shipping and LNG infrastructure. Russia has increasingly turned to China and non-Western states such as India. Chinese vessels play a larger role in traffic along the Northern Sea Route.
Military: China breaks new ground, but will it move beyond symbolism?
The two countries have conducted their first-ever joint naval drills and bomber patrols in the Bering Sea. While coastguard cooperation has been formalised, broader military collaboration in the region remains limited and may be more symbolic than strategic.
Governance: Russia softens stance, but change may be short-lived
Historically opposed to including non-Arctic states in Arctic governance, since 2022 Russia has signalled openness to broader cooperation. But this shift could be tactical, aimed at pressuring Western states to re-engage Russia.
Recommendations
- Differentiate the specific risks of Sino-Russian cooperation from the broader, long-term challenges posed independently by China and Russia in the Arctic.
- Distinguish Sino-Russian activities within the Russian Arctic from any expansion into waters around Canada or Greenland, which would trigger a stronger NATO response.
- Reinforce Nordic agency in Arctic governance to prepare for a possible US–Russia reset that sidelines European interests.
- Stay alert to genuine risks while avoiding securitisation of symbolic moves that may escalate regional tensions unnecessarily.
Average Rating